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Internal Security Review
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1. What Was Tested
We build a security platform, so we hold our own platform to the standard we help customers meet. The founder, who is one person, assesses the platform from an outside attacker's position. This is an internal review, not an independent third-party penetration test. The latest review, on 9 October 2026, validated the externally reachable controls on our website and API. It builds on the wider review of 23 August 2026, which attacked tenant isolation, authentication, and the application itself with the same industry-standard offensive tooling a real attacker would use.
| Latest review | 9 October 2026 — outside-in configuration and control validation of the public website (simplesecurity.se) and the application API (api.simplesecurity.se) |
|---|---|
| Wider review | 23 August 2026 — the public website, the customer application, and the backend API and identity services hosted in AWS Stockholm (eu-north-1) |
| Performed by | The founder (one person), testing from an outside attacker's position with the tools and methods listed here — an honest self-assessment, not an independent test, published as such |
| Methodology | October: non-intrusive, rate-limited outside-in testing in four parallel workstreams — reconnaissance and email security, encryption and headers, vulnerability and exposure scanning (more than 11,000 automated templates plus dedicated exposure and takeover checks), and API access control — with no disruption and no data access. August: automated scanning plus targeted manual testing, with coverage aligned to the OWASP Top 10 vulnerability classes |
| Type | Tested from outside, grey-box, non-destructive — no denial-of-service, no password brute-forcing, no data extraction |
| Coverage | August test, seven parallel workstreams: reconnaissance and DNS, transport encryption, HTTP security headers and web vulnerability scanning, content and storage exposure, API and authenticated backend testing, authentication and session-token security, and email and DNS security |
| Overall risk rating | Low |
The sections below describe what was attempted and what happened. We have deliberately written this in plain language rather than tool output, and we have left out the low-level technical detail that would only be useful to somebody attacking the platform. Sections 2, 3 and 5 report the hands-on testing from the August review; the October review re-confirmed the externally visible controls in sections 4 to 7.
2. Keeping Your Data Separate
For a multi-tenant platform this is the finding that matters most: can one customer reach another customer's data? The assessment attacked that boundary directly.
- Identifier manipulation was rejectedRequests were replayed with other customers' record identifiers, fabricated identifiers, sequential guesses, malformed values, and path-traversal attempts. All were refused.
- Tenant is decided by the server, not the clientAttempts to override the tenant through request parameters or custom headers had no effect. Which organisation you belong to is resolved from your cryptographically verified session and cannot be influenced by anything the browser sends.
- No cross-tenant leakage was observedNo request returned data belonging to another organisation.
- Permission checks fail closedAttempts to reach endpoints using unexpected HTTP methods were rejected at the gateway, before reaching application code. Re-confirmed on 9 October 2026 across seven HTTP methods.
3. Authentication & Sessions
Session tokens were subjected to a full battery of forgery and tampering techniques — removing the signature, downgrading the signing algorithm, substituting keys, editing the identity and permission claims inside the token, and replaying expired tokens. Every attempt was rejected. The October review repeated the core of this: requests with no token, a malformed token, an unsigned token, and a token signed with a guessable key were all refused.
- Permissions are never taken from the tokenWhat you are allowed to do is looked up on the server for each request, not read from a value the client could edit.
- Account creation is controlledSelf-service sign-up is disabled at the identity-provider level, not merely hidden in the interface.
- No account enumerationThe login flow does not reveal whether an email address is registered, so it cannot be used to harvest a list of our customers.
- Automated abuse protectionA rate-limiting control engages against high-volume traffic from a single source, and was confirmed to block during testing.
4. Encryption
All customer traffic is encrypted in transit with TLS 1.2 or 1.3, and all stored data is encrypted at rest with AES-256.
Connections use forward secrecy and valid certificates, and HSTS is enforced
(max-age of one year, all subdomains, with the preload directive)
— browsers refuse to connect to us over an unencrypted channel. Submission
to the browsers' HSTS preload list is still pending. Both
the website and the API accept only TLS 1.2 and 1.3; older protocol
versions are not offered, and both offer only forward-secret cipher suites.
Certificates are issued through AWS Certificate Manager, were confirmed
valid on 9 October 2026, and the website staples certificate status
(OCSP) to every connection.
5. Common Web Attacks
The assessment swept the platform for the standard classes of web vulnerability using automated scanners with roughly 6,600 detection templates, plus targeted manual testing. No SQL injection, command injection, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, insecure direct object references, or cross-origin misconfigurations were found. Input is validated on the server, and error responses do not leak internal detail.
Browser-side protections were confirmed in place across the site: a strict Content Security Policy, clickjacking and MIME-sniffing protections, a restrictive referrer policy, and cross-origin isolation headers — including on error responses, which are a commonly missed gap.
The October review added three checks. The API answers cross-origin requests only for our own website and never echoes back an unknown origin. A port scan of the website found only the two web ports open. Dedicated exposure and subdomain-takeover checks returned nothing.
6. Email Impersonation
Phishing that impersonates a vendor is one of the most common ways an attacker reaches that vendor's customers. Our domain is protected by the full set of email authentication standards, all verified during the assessment:
- SPF and DKIMOnly our authorised mail systems can send as our domain, and mail sent through our email-sending service (Amazon SES) is cryptographically signed with DKIM.
- DMARC at the strictest settingOur policy is
p=reject. A forged email claiming to come from us is refused outright by receiving mail systems — not merely filed as spam. - MTA-STS in enforce mode, with TLS reportingMail sent to us must travel over a verified encrypted connection. An attacker on the network cannot force a downgrade to plain text, and receiving systems report any delivery that fails that check.
- DNSSEC and CAAOur DNS records are cryptographically signed against tampering, and only named certificate authorities are permitted to issue certificates for our domain.
7. Exposed Data & Secrets
The assessment searched for the mistakes that most often cause breaches: exposed source-code repositories, configuration and backup files, hard-coded credentials in browser JavaScript, and publicly readable cloud storage. None were found, and the October review confirmed it: cloud storage is not publicly listable, and published scripts contain no embedded secrets or keys. Our internal staff console is not part of the public application, and no internal hostnames or addresses are shipped to browsers.
8. Findings 1 Low · 5 Info
The latest review raised one Low-severity finding and five informational observations. Each is listed here with our reasoning rather than left out.
| Finding | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|
| The API accepted four older TLS 1.2 cipher suites without forward secrecy, which the website already refused | Low | Fixed — 9 October 2026 |
| Cloud provider, CDN and web application firewall identifiable from headers and DNS | Info | Accepted — expected for cloud hosting |
| Mail autodiscovery record and the API's underlying AWS hostname visible in DNS | Info | Accepted — expected |
| Automated header check flagged browser-page headers as missing on the API's JSON responses, and two optional headers on the website | Info | Accepted — not applicable |
| Automated tooling flagged response compression on the public website | Info | Accepted — not applicable |
| Registry lock is not enabled for our domain at the .se registry | Info | Under review — operational hardening |
The Low finding was a weaker cipher setting on the API than on the website. The API only accepted modern TLS versions, but a client could still choose an older cipher suite that does not protect past sessions if a server key were ever stolen. No exploitable weakness was shown. We moved the API to Amazon's forward-secret-only TLS policy, so it now matches the website.
The header note concerns headers that instruct browsers how to render pages. The API returns data, not pages, so they have no effect there; it does send HSTS and MIME-type protection. On the website, the two optional headers cover legacy plug-in content and a strict cross-origin embedding mode we do not need.
The compression note comes from a generic tooling heuristic. Compression only matters when a response mixes secret values with input an attacker controls; our public website is static content with no such secrets. Being able to tell which providers we use is standard for this architecture and of negligible value to an attacker. Registry lock adds protection against unauthorised domain transfers and is a decision for our domain administration.
9. Scope & Limitations
We would rather be straight with you about what this assessment does and does not prove.
Testing was done from outside, time-boxed, and non-destructive. No denial-of-service or password brute-forcing was performed, injection tooling ran at low-risk settings without extracting data, and write operations were exercised only through a sandboxed demo account. Third-party services outside our control were excluded.
The October review was non-intrusive and rate-limited: it caused no disruption and accessed no data. Data separation between customer accounts on signed-in sessions was not re-exercised in that pass, because it needs a dedicated in-application test account; it was last tested in the August review (section 2) and will be re-exercised in a follow-up assessment. Brute-force content discovery was deliberately not run, to keep the review non-intrusive; dedicated exposure checks and a manual sensitive-path check covered the same ground.
A clean result for a given technique means no issue was observed during the test window — not a mathematical guarantee that none exists. Each section reflects the state of the platform on the date it was tested. The detailed technical findings, tooling output, and evidence files remain confidential; they are available to customers and prospects under NDA as part of a vendor-risk review.
10. Ongoing Commitment
Security is continuous, not a one-time certificate.
We re-test after significant changes, remediate findings promptly, and publish what we find.
We also welcome outside security research. We publish a security.txt with a security contact, and we credit researchers who report issues to us on our hall of fame. If you have questions about our security practices, or need documentation for a vendor-risk review, contact us at security@simplesecurity.se.